

Eleventh Edition

THE WESTERN HERITAGE, SINCE 1300

Revised AP[®] Edition

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
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One of the most important accomplishments of the European Community was the launching on January 1, 1999, of the Euro, a single monetary unit that replaced the national currencies of most of its member nations. In Frankfurt, Germany, people crowded around a symbol of the new currency. The world financial crisis that commenced in 2008 has placed any internal pressures on the European Community and on its currency. AP Wide World Photos

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

How has migration changed the face of Europe?

What effect did the Great Depression and World War II have on the way Europeans viewed the role of government in social and economic life?

How did the status of women in business, politics, and the professions change in Europe in the second half of the twentieth century?

How was cultural and intellectual life transformed in Europe during the twentieth century?

How did the Cold War shape Western art in the second half of the twentieth century?

How has the Christian heritage of the West been affected by events of the twentieth century?

What impact has the computer had on twentieth-century society?

What led to Western European unification following World War II?

Was the year 2008 a turning point in the relationship between the United States and Europe?

THE COLD WAR defined the life of the West during most of the second half of the twentieth century. This conflict affected not only political developments and military alliances, but also the lives of millions of Europeans and Americans. For almost half a century, the easy travel throughout the world that many people take for granted today and that enriches the lives of thousands of American students every year was impossible. Vast areas were closed off. The Iron Curtain separated families. Most of Eastern Europe developed separately from Western Europe, with consequences in the quality of life, approaches to the relationship between states and their citizenry, and attitudes about gender, social responsibility, the environment, and the future.

Nevertheless, European society in both Eastern and Western Europe changed remarkably after World War II, as did, of course, the United States. Western Europe enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, peace, and technological advances. During the same years, Europe also took unprecedented steps toward economic cooperation and political union.

How has migration changed the face of Europe?

 **Watch the Video** “Video Lectures: Identity Politics: Notting Hill Carnival” on MyHistoryLab.com

▼ The Twentieth-Century Movement of Peoples

In the twentieth century, the movement of peoples transformed European society and the character of many European communities. The Soviets’ and Nazis’ forced migrations, deportations, and, in some cases, mass executions were only the most dramatic examples of this kind of demographic change through violence. World War II and the subsequent economic transformation of the Continent brought extensive migrations. The most pervasive trend in this movement of peoples was the continuing shift from the countryside to the cities. Today, except for Albania, at least one-third of the population of every European nation lives in large cities. In Western Europe, city dwellers are approximately 75 percent of the population.


Other vast forced movements of peoples by governments, however, were little discussed during the Cold War. During the twentieth century, millions of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Finns, Chechens, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Bosnian Muslims, and other peoples were displaced.

These forced displacements transformed parts of Europe. Stalin moved whole nationalities from one area of the Soviet Union and its satellite states to another. Millions of people were killed in the process. The Nazis first displaced the Jews and then sought to exterminate them. Throughout Eastern Europe, cities that once had large Jewish populations and a vibrant Jewish religious and cultural life lost any Jewish presence. The displacement of Germans from Eastern Europe back into Germany immediately after World War II transformed cities that had had large German populations into places almost wholly populated by self-identified Czechs, Poles, or Russians.

Displacement Through War

World War II created a vast refugee problem. An estimated 46 million people were displaced in central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union alone between 1938 and 1948. Many cities in Germany and in central and Eastern Europe had been bombed or overrun by invading armies. The Nazis had moved hundreds of thousands of foreign workers into Germany as slave laborers. Millions more were prisoners of war. Some of these people returned to their homeland willingly; others, particularly Soviet prisoners fearful of being executed by Stalin, had to be forced to go back, and many were executed. Hundreds of thousands of Baltic, Polish, and Yugoslav prisoners found asylum in Western Europe.

Changes in political borders after the war also uprooted many people. For example, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary forcibly expelled millions of ethnic Germans from their territories to Germany. This transfer of over 12 million Germans in

 **View the Map** “Map Discovery: Events in Eastern Europe, 1989–1990” on MyHistoryLab.com

ct “solved” the problem of German minorities living outside of Germany’s original boundaries that had been one of Hitler’s excuses for aggression against neighboring countries, but at tremendous cost for those involved. In another case of forced migration, hundreds of thousands of Poles were transferred from territory the Soviet Union annexed to Poland’s new western territories, acquired from Germany. Other minorities, such as Ukrainians in Poland and Italians on the Yugoslav coast, were sent back into what were presented as their “homelands,” although many had never set foot on the territory of Ukraine or Italy before. As one historian has commented, “War, violence, and massive social dislocation turned Versailles’s dream of national homogeneity into realities.”¹

External and Internal Migration

Between 1945 and 1960, approximately half a million Europeans left Europe each year. This was the largest outward migration since the 1920s, when around 700,000 persons had left annually. In the second half of the nineteenth century, most immigrants had been from rural areas. After World War II, they often included educated professionals and skilled workers. Immediately after the war, some governments encouraged migration because they were afraid that, as in the 1930s, their economies would not be able to provide adequate employment for all their citizens.

Decolonization in the postwar period led many European colonials to return to Europe from overseas. The most dramatic example of this phenomenon was the more than one million French colonials who moved to France after the end of the Algerian war in 1962 (see Chapter 21). Britons returned from parts of the British Empire; Dutch returned from Indonesia in the late 1940s; Belgians from the Congo in the 1960s; and Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola in the 1970s.

Decolonization also led non-European inhabitants of the former colonies to migrate to Europe. Great Britain, for example, received thousands of immigrants from its former colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. France received many immigrants from its empire in Africa, Indochina, and the Arab world. This influx has proved to be a long-term source of social tension and conflict. In particular, racial tensions were high during the 1980s. France faced similar difficulties, which contributed to the emergence of the National Front, an extreme right-wing group led by Jean-Marie Le Pen (b. 1928) that sought to exploit the resentment many working-class voters felt toward North African immigrants. In 2002, Le Pen won enough votes to become one of the two candidates in the run-off election for the French presidency, although he lost overwhelmingly to Jacques Chirac (b. 1932) in the final ballot. Similar pressures have arisen in Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Such tension did not result only from migration from Africa and Asia; internal European migration—from the Balkans, Turkey, and the former Soviet Union, often of people in search of jobs—also changed the social and economic face of the Continent and led to a backlash. In recent years, internal immigration within the European Union has seen the movement of significant numbers of people. However, the growing Muslim presence in Europe has produced some of the most serious ethnic and political tensions.

The New Muslim Population

As recounted earlier in this textbook, well into the twentieth century the European relationship with most of the Muslim world was fraught with misinformation and misunderstanding. Muslims from the Ottoman Empire, the greatest Muslim empire, rarely traveled in Europe, and few Europeans traveled in the empire. Europeans encountered Muslims mainly as subjects, in colonies such as Algeria, Egypt, the

Indian subcontinent, sub-Saharan Africa, and the East Indies. In all these regions from at least the mid-nineteenth century onward, Christian missionaries often clashed with Muslim religious teachers.


At the same time, most Europeans, except for a few communities in the Balkans and the former Soviet Empire, regarded themselves and their national cultures as either Christian or secular. Indeed, until recently most Europeans paid little direct attention to Islam as a domestic matter.


That indifference began to change in the 1960s and had dissolved by the end of the twentieth century as a sizable Muslim population settled in Europe. This highly diverse immigrant community had become an issue in Europe even before the events of September 11, 2001.


The immigration of Muslims into Europe, and particularly Western Europe, arose from two chief sources: European economic growth and decolonization. As the economies of Western Europe began to recover in the quarter century after World War II, a labor shortage developed. To fill this demand, Western Europe imported laborers, many of whom came from Muslim nations. For example, Turkish “guest workers” were invited to move to West Germany—on a temporary basis, it was presumed—in the 1960s, and Britain welcomed Pakistanis. The aftermath of decolonization and the quest for a better life led Muslims from East Africa and the Indian subcontinent to settle in Great Britain. The Algerian war brought many Muslims to France. Today there are approximately 1.3 million Muslims in Great Britain, 3.2 million in Germany, and 4.2 million in France. Smaller but still significant numbers have settled in Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

These Muslim immigrant communities share certain social and religious characteristics. Originally, many Muslims came to Europe expecting they would eventually return to their homes, an expectation their host countries shared. Neither the immigrants nor the host nations gave much thought to assimilation. Moreover, except for Great Britain, where all immigrants from the Commonwealth may vote immediately upon settling there, European governments made it difficult for Muslim or any other immigrants to take part in civic life. Unlike the United States, few European countries had any experience dealing with large-scale immigration. The Muslim communities have, therefore, generally remained unassimilated and self-contained. This segregation has provided internal community support for Muslim immigrants but has also prevented them from fully engaging with the societies in which they live. Many of their children have not learned European languages well, and Muslim women face challenges from both their own communities and the host communities when they try to become professionally or politically active outside the home.

Yet the world around these communities has changed. Many of the largely unskilled jobs that the immigrants originally filled have disappeared. Most of the Muslim immigrants to Europe, unlike many who have settled in the United States and Canada, were neither highly skilled nor professionally educated. As a result, they and their adult children who may have grown up in Europe find it difficult to get jobs in the modern service economy. Furthermore, as European economic growth has slowed, European Muslims have become the target of politicians, such as Le Pen in France, who seek to blame the immigrants for a host of problems, from crime to unemployment.

 **Read the Document**
“Justin Vaïsse, from ‘Veiled Meaning’ (France) 2004” on
MyHistoryLab.com

 **Read the Document** “Jörg Haider, from *The Freedom I Mean* (Austria), 1995” on
MyHistoryLab.com



A woman carrying an election leaflet walks past a polling station in the east end of London. The presence of foreign-born Muslims whose labor is necessary for the prosperity of the European economy is an important issue in contemporary Europe. Many of these Muslims live in self-contained communities. Paul Hackett/Reuters

The radicalization of parts of the Islamic world has also touched the Muslim communities in Europe. Although Turkish Muslims living in Germany come from a nation that has been secularized since the 1920s and thus tend to be less religiously fervent than Pakistani Muslims dwelling in Great Britain, Muslims from both countries have been involved in radical Islamic groups. The July 7, 2005, suicide bombings in London were carried out by four young Muslims, three of whom had been born in the United Kingdom and one in Jamaica. By contrast, the French government has exerted more control over its Muslim population. However, that policy appeared to have failed badly when in the autumn of 2005 immigrant youth, largely Muslim, carried out riots in various parts of France. These were the most serious civil disturbances in France since 1968. Subsequent riots have occurred in Paris. There have also been sharp disputes in France over attempts by the government to forbid veiling Muslim women from wearing headscarves while attending secular government schools. The controversy over headscarves in France, which opponents say violates the French principle of a secular republic, has become so heated that a feminist candidate representing a far-left political group, the Nouveau Parti Anti-capitaliste, in 2007 has been attacked for wearing a headscarf despite her public support of secularism and feminism.

Nonetheless, European Muslims are not a homogeneous group. They come from different countries, have different class backgrounds, and espouse different Islamic traditions. Many European Muslims and Muslim clerics disagree strongly with each other. At the same time, these Muslim communities, so often now marked by deep poverty and unemployment, have become a major concern for European social workers who disagree among themselves about how their governments should respond to them. What has become clear, however, is that European governments cannot regard their Muslim populations as passive communities; rather, European governments and societies must engage them as a permanent fact in the life of early twenty-first-century Europe.

European Population Trends

During the past quarter century, the European birthrate has stabilized in a manner that has deeply disturbed many observers. Europeans are having so few children that they are no longer replacing themselves. Whereas in the 1950s European women on average bore 2.1 children (the minimum replacement level), that rate fell to 1.9 in the 1980s, 1.47 in the early 2000s, and has rebounded slightly to 1.5 at present. In some countries, including Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the rate is even lower. In the early twenty-first century, the United States fertility rate reached its lowest level in a century, 2.0, but was still substantially higher than European rates. If the current rates more or less hold, by the middle of this century, the United States will have more people than Europe for the first time in history.

There is no consensus on why the European birthrate has declined. One reason often cited is that women are postponing having children until later in their childbearing years. Another is that the economic crises of the past decade have made multiple children an indulgence some families feel they cannot afford. This demographic trend suggests that Europe may soon need new workers from outside its borders. Nevertheless, in response to public opinion, governments have been trying to limit immigration into Europe.

This falling birthrate means that Europe faces the prospect of an aging population, with fewer workers and more retirees. This puts tremendous financial stress on these European states that have traditionally provided strong state-funded support for retired persons. Postwar European prosperity has been tied to a strong welfare system, which the new demographics may make it impossible for states to continue to afford.

 Read the **Compare and Connect** on MyHistoryLab.com

IN APRIL 2011, a French law banning the wearing of certain types of veils in public went into effect. The ban applied to a covering that exposed only a woman's eyes, known outside of France as a niqab, but referred to as a burqa in the French debate. The 2011 law was only one further step in an extended debate about the place of public displays of religious piety, women's rights, the role of Muslims in French public life, and France's secular tradition. In 2004, France had already banned the wearing of veils in public schools. In June 2009, French president Nicolas Sarkozy explained his support of a more thorough ban: "We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity. . . . That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's dignity. The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic." In the months preceding and following the ban, France's public conversations about the veil exposed the complexity of a subject that involves feminists, Muslims, and advocates of minority rights in France, with representatives of each group often on both sides of the debate.

QUESTIONS

1. How and why is the debate about the veil particularly fierce in France? What elements of French history and identity are challenged by the veil?
2. How does Eltahawy distinguish between Muslims' rights and the right to wear a veil?
3. Why might feminists be divided over the issue of the veil? In what ways are women's rights involved in this debate, and who claims to speak on behalf of women?
4. What are the different reasons cited for women's wearing of the veil? Are all of them related to religious piety?
5. What larger issues about the role of Muslims in France are exposed by this debate?

I. Mona Eltahawy Argues Women's Rights Trump Cultural Relativism

Defenders of the French ban on the veil include some prominent Muslim women. Mona Eltahawy, an award-winning columnist born in Egypt and currently living in New York City, calls herself a "proud liberal Muslim." Her opposition to the veil is based not on fear of Islam, but on her belief that representing the veil as a necessary sign of Muslim feminine piety stems from a misinterpretation of the Koran. Her commentary shows the complexity of a debate that includes topics as diverse as xenophobia, cultural relativism, feminism, secularism, and a deep conflict about the nature of individual freedom.

Some have likened this issue to Switzerland's move last year to ban the construction of minarets. . . .

Underlying both bans is a dangerous silence: liberal refusal to robustly discuss what it means to be European, what it means to be Muslim, and racism and immigration. Liberals decrying the infringement of women's rights should acknowledge that the absence of debate on these critical issues allowed the political right and the Muslim right to seize the situation.

Europe's ascendant political right is unapologetically xenophobic. It caricatures the religion that I practice

and uses those distortions to fan Islamophobia. But ultra-conservative strains of Islam, such as Salafism and Wahhabism, also caricature our religion and use that Islamophobia to silence opposition. . . .

The strains of Islam that promote face veils do not believe in the concept of a woman's right to choose and describe women as needing to be hidden to prove their "worth." . . . There is no choice in such conditioning. That is not a message Muslims learn in our holy book, the Koran, nor is the face veil prescribed by the majority of Muslim scholars.

The French ban has been condemned as anti-liberal and anti-feminist. Where were those howls when niqabs began appearing in European countries, where for years women fought for rights? A bizarre political correctness tied the tongues of those who would normally rally to defend women's rights.

There are several ideological conflicts here: Within Islam, liberal and feminist Muslims refuse to believe that full-length veils are mandatory. . . . Feminist groups run by Muslim women in various Western countries fight misogynistic practices justified in the name of culture and religion. Cultural relativists, they say, don't want to "offend" anyone by protesting the disappearance of women behind the veil—or worse.

For example, French women of North African and Arab descent launched *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores Nor Submissives) in response to violence against women in housing projects and forced marriages of migrant women in France. That group supports the ban and has denounced the racism faced in France by migrant women and men.

Cultural integration has failed, or not taken place, in many European countries, but women shouldn't pay the price for it. ■

From Mona Eltahawy, "From Liberals and Feminists, Unsettling Silence on Rending the Muslim Veil," *Washington Post*, Saturday, July 17, 2010, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071604356.html>.

Kenza Drider Defends Her Right to Wear the Veil in Public

Kenza Drider was an ordinary French citizen before the debate about the public wearing of the veil took over French politics and society. A housewife and mother of two, Drider insists that wearing the veil is an expression of her personal freedom, and not a reflection of pressure coming from her husband, father, or any religious authority. Her husband, Allal, told a reporter that his response when he first saw his wife in a full-body niqab was: "Are you really going out dressed like that?" When other women were fined for violating the French ban in September 2011, Kenza Drider announced her largely symbolic candidacy for president against incumbent President Sarkozy.

I will be going about my business in my full veil as I have for the last 12 years and nothing and nobody is going to stop me. . . . This whole law makes France

look ridiculous. . . . I never thought I'd see the day when France, my France, the country I was born in and I love, the country of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, would do something that so obviously violates people's freedom.

I'll be getting on with my life and if they want to send me to prison for wearing the niqab then so be it. One thing's for sure: I'm not taking it off.

[Wearing a veil] is not a religious constraint since it is not laid down in Islam or the Qur'an that I have to wear a full veil. It is my personal choice. . . .

I would never encourage others to do it just because I do. That is their choice. My daughters can do what they like. As I tell them, this is my choice, not theirs. . . .

I never covered my head when I was young. I came from a family of practising Muslims, but we were not expected to even wear a headscarf. Then I began looking into Islam and what it meant to be a Muslim and decided to wear a headscarf. Afterwards in my research into the wives of the Prophet I saw they wore the full veil and I liked this idea and decided to wear it. Before, I had felt something was missing. Then I put it on and I felt serene and complete. It pleased me and it has become a part of me. . . .

When President Sarkozy said: 'The burqa is not welcome in France', the president, my president, opened the door for racism, aggression and attacks on Islam. This is an attempt to stigmatise Islam and it has created enormous racism and Islamophobia that wasn't there before. . . .

This is about basic fundamental human rights and freedoms. I will go out in my full veil and I will fight. I'm prepared to go all the way to the European court of human rights and I will fight for my liberty.

Fines? They don't bother me. What is the state going to do, send a policeman outside my front door to give me a ticket every time I go out? For me this is women's liberty, the liberty to wear what I wish and not be punished for it.

If women want to walk around half-naked I don't object to them doing so. If they want to wear tight jeans where you can see their underwear or walk around with their breasts hanging out, I don't give a damn. But if they are allowed to do that, why should I not be allowed to cover up? ■

From Kim Willsher, "'Burqa ban' in France: housewife vows to face jail rather than submit," *The Observer*, Saturday, April 9, 2011, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/10/france-burqa-law-kenza-drider>.



Kenza Drider, a French housewife from the town of Avignon, appears in public in a niqab, a face covering that reveals only her eyes, despite a 2011 ban on such veils in France. © Reuters

What effect did the Great Depression and World War II have on the way Europeans viewed the role of government in social and economic life?

▼ Toward a Welfare State Society

In the second half of the twentieth century, the nations of Western Europe achieved unprecedented economic prosperity and maintained or inaugurated independent, liberal democratic governments. Most of them also confronted problems associated with decolonization and with maintaining economic growth.

The end of World War II saw vast constitutional changes in much of Western Europe, except for Portugal and Spain, which remained dictatorships until the mid-1970s. Before or during the war, Germany, Austria, Italy, and France had experienced authoritarian governments. The construction of stable, liberal, democratic political frameworks became a major goal of their postwar political leaders, as well as of the United States. All concerned recognized that the earlier political structures in those nations had failed to resist the rise of right-wing, antidemocratic movements. The Great Depression had shown that democracy requires a social and economic base, as well as a political structure. Most Europeans came to believe that government ought to ensure economic prosperity and social security. Success at doing so, they hoped, would stave off the kind of turmoil that had brought on tyranny and war.

Christian Democratic Parties

Democratic socialist parties faced challenges in the postwar era, in which they were opposed by both conservatives and communists. Some were successful, including the British Labour Party, and social democratic parties in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. On the continent, social democratic parties often shared power with various Christian democratic parties. Those Christian democratic parties, usually leading coalition governments, often introduced new policies that were also supported by social democrats.

Christian democratic parties were a major new feature of postwar politics. They were largely Roman Catholic in leadership and membership. Catholic parties had existed in Europe since the late nineteenth century. Until the 1930s, however, they had been conservative and had protected the social, political, and educational interests of the church. The postwar Christian democratic parties of Germany, France, Austria, and Italy, however, welcomed non-Catholic members. Democracy, economic growth, and anticommunism were their hallmarks. After 1947, in a policy that responded to United States pressure as well as internal conviction, communists were systematically excluded from Western European governments.

The Creation of Welfare States

The Great Depression, the rise of authoritarian states in the wake of economic dislocation and mass unemployment, and World War II, which involved more people in a war effort than ever before, changed how many Europeans thought about social welfare. Governments began to spend more on social welfare than they did on the military. This reallocation of funds was a reaction to the state violence of the first half of the century.

The modern European welfare state was broadly similar across the Continent. Before World War II, except in Scandinavia, the two basic models for social legislation were the German and the British. Bismarck had introduced social insurance in Germany during the 1880s to undermine the German Social Democratic Party. In effect, the imperial German government provided workers with social insurance and thus some sense of social security while denying them significant political participation. In early-twentieth-century Britain, where all classes had access to the political system, social insurance was targeted toward the poor. In both the German and British systems, workers were insured only against the risks from disease, injury on the job, and old age. Unemployment was assumed to be only

short-term problem and often one that workers brought on themselves. People her up in the social structure could look out for themselves and did not need government help.

After World War II, the concept emerged that social insurance against predictable risks was a social right and should be available to all citizens. In Britain, William B. Beveridge (1879–1963) famously set forth this concept in 1942. Paradoxically, making coverage universal, as Beveridge recommended, appealed to conservatives as well as socialists. If medical care, old-age pensions, and other benefits were available to all, they would not become a device to redistribute income from one part of the population to another.

The first major European nation to begin to create a welfare state was Britain, in 1945 to 1951 under the Labour Party ministry of Clement Attlee (1883–1967). The most important element of this early legislation was the creation of the National Health Service. France and Germany did not adopt similar health care legislation until the 1970s because their governments initially refused to make coverage universal.

The spread of welfare legislation (including unemployment insurance) within Western Europe was related to both the Cold War and domestic political and economic policy. The communist states of Eastern Europe provided their people social security as well as full employment. The capitalist states came to believe they had to provide similar security for their people, in order to disarm the potential appeal of communism within their populations.


Resistance to the Expansion of the Welfare State

Western European attitudes toward the welfare state have reflected four periods that have marked economic life since the end of the war. The first period was one of reconstruction from 1945 through the early 1950s. It was followed by the second period—almost twenty-five years of generally steady and expanding economic growth. The third period brought first an era of inflation in the late 1970s and then one of relatively low growth and high unemployment from the 1990s to the early twenty-first century. We are now in the midst of a fourth period, in which financial crises have led to unstable economies and a questioning of the safety of allowing the market to self-regulate. During each of the first two periods, a general conviction existed, based on Keynesian economics, that the foundation of economic policy was government involvement in a mixed economy. From the late 1970s, more people came to believe the market should be allowed to regulate itself and that government should be less involved in, though not completely withdraw from, the economy. Most recently, the financial crises of the twenty-first century have led many Europeans to question their earlier abandonment of Keynesian economics.

The most influential political figure in reasserting the importance of markets and resisting the power of labor unions was Margaret Thatcher (b. 1925) of the British Conservative Party who served as prime minister from 1979 to 1990. She cut taxes and sought to curb inflation. She and her party were determined to roll back many of the socialist policies that Britain had enacted since the war. Her administration privatized many industries that Labour Party governments had nationalized. She also curbed the power of the trade unions in a series of



Margaret Thatcher, a shopkeeper's daughter who became the first female prime minister of Great Britain, served in that office from May 1979 through November 1990. Known as the "Iron Lady" of British politics, she led the Conservative Party to three electoral victories and carried out extensive restructuring of the British government and economy. In this photo, she greets the audience of the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton after an IRA bomb attack on her hotel earlier that day. © Bettmann/CORBIS

 **Read the Compare and Connect** “Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair Debate Government’s Social Responsibility for Welfare” on MyHistoryLab.com

How did the status of women in business, politics, and the professions change in Europe in the second half of the twentieth century?

bitter and often violent confrontations. Although her administration roused enormous controversy, she was able to push these policies through Parliament. Furthermore, over time the British Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair (b. 1953) itself largely came to accept what was at the time known as the Thatcher Revolution.

While Thatcher redirected the British economy, the government-furnished welfare services now found across continental Europe began to encounter resistance. The funding on which they are based assumed a growing population and low unemployment. As the proportion of the population consuming the services of the welfare state—the sick, the injured, the unemployed, and the elderly—increases relative to the number of able-bodied workers who pay for them, the costs of those services have risen.

The leveling-off of population growth in Europe discussed in the previous section has thus imperiled the benefits of the welfare state. Furthermore, during the past two decades, significant levels of unemployment in major Western European nations have increased welfare payments. The low fertility rates across the Continent mean the next working generation will have fewer people to support the retired elderly population, creating a challenge to the system that has been the hallmark of postwar European prosperity.

▼ New Patterns in Work and Expectations of Women

Since World War II, the work patterns and social expectations of European women have changed enormously. In all social ranks, women have begun to assume larger economic and political roles. More women have entered the “learned professions,” and more are filling major managerial positions than ever before in European history. Yet, despite enormous gains during the second half of the twentieth century, and despite the collapse of those authoritarian governments whose social policies inhibited women from advancing into the mainstream of society, gender inequality remained a major characteristic of the social life of Europe at the opening of the twenty-first century.

Feminism

Since World War II, European feminism, although less highly organized than in America, has set forth a new agenda. The most influential postwar work on women’s issues was Simone de Beauvoir’s (1908–1986) *The Second Sex*, published in 1949. In that work, de Beauvoir explored the difference being a woman had made in her life. (See the Document “Simone de Beauvoir Urges Economic Freedom for Women,” page 844.) She was part of the French intellectual establishment and thus wrote from a privileged position. Nonetheless, she and other European feminists argued that, at all levels, European women experienced distinct social and economic disadvantages. Divorce and family laws, for example, favored men. European feminists also called attention to the social problems that women faced, including spousal abuse.

In contrast to earlier feminism, recent feminism has been less a political movement pressing for specific rights than a social movement offering a broader critique of European culture. Several new feminist journals appeared during the 1970s, many of which are still published: *Courage*, *Emma—Magazine by Women for Women*, and *Spare Rib*. A statement in *Spare Rib*, an English magazine, captures the spirit of these publications:

Spare Rib aims to reflect women’s lives in all their diverse situations so that they can recognize themselves in its pages. This is done by making the magazine a vehicle for their writing and their images. Most of all, *Spare Rib* aims to bring women together and support them in taking control of their lives.²

²Bonnie S. Anderson and Judith P. Zinsser, *A History of Their Own: Women in Europe from Prehistory to the Present*, Vol. 2 (New York: HarperPerennial, 1988), p. 412.



Simone de Beauvoir was the major feminist writer in postwar Europe. Here she appears as a defense witness at the trial of a mother accused of helping her minor daughter receive an abortion. © Michel Artault/Api/Sygma/CORBIS

This emphasis on women controlling their own lives may be the most important element of recent European feminism. Whereas in the past feminists sought and, in significant measure, gained legal and civil equality with men, they are now pursuing personal independence and issues that are particular to women. In this sense, feminism is an important manifestation of the critical tradition in Western culture.

More Married Women in the Workforce

Throughout the postwar period, the number of married women in the workforce has risen sharply. Both middle-class and working-class married women have sought jobs outside the home. Because of the low birthrate in the 1930s, there were fewer young single women in Europe in the years just after World War II. Married women entered the job market to replace them. Some factories changed their work shifts to accommodate the needs of married women. Consumer conveniences and improvements in health care also made it easier for married women to enter the workforce by reducing the demands child care and housekeeping made on their time. At the same time, all surveys indicate that the need to provide care for their children continues to be the most important difficulty women face in the workplace. Where child care is inadequate, unavailable, or unaffordable, women are more likely to remain in part-time employment. This contributes to income inequality for women and limited career opportunities relative to men in the same occupations and with the same qualifications.

In the twentieth century, children were no longer expected to contribute substantially to family income. They now spend more than a decade in compulsory education. Many families need more income than one worker can provide. Such financial necessity led many married women back to work. Evidence also suggests that married

Document

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR URGES ECONOMIC FREEDOM FOR WOMEN



*Simone de Beauvoir was the most important feminist voice of mid-twentieth-century Europe. In *The Second Sex*, published in France in 1949, she explored the experience of women coming of age in a world of ideas, institutions, and social expectations shaped historically by men. Much of the book discusses the psychological strategies that modern European women had developed to deal with their status as “the second sex.” Toward the end of her book, de Beauvoir argues that economic freedom and advancement for women are fundamental to their personal fulfillment.*

Why does de Beauvoir argue that economic freedom for women must accompany their achievement of civic rights? Why does the example of the small number of professional women illustrate issues for European women in general? How does she indicate that even professional women must overcome a culture in which the experience of women is fundamentally different from that of men? Do de Beauvoir’s comments seem relevant for women at the opening of the twenty-first century? What similarities do you see to the views of Priscilla Wakefield (Chapter 7) and Mary Wollstonecraft (Chapter 9)?

According to French law, obedience is no longer included among the duties of a wife, and each woman citizen has the right to vote; but these civil liberties remain theoretical as long as they are unaccompanied by economic freedom. . . . It is through gainful employment that woman has traversed most of the distance that separated her from the male; and nothing else can guarantee her liberty in practice. Once she ceases to be a parasite, the system based on her dependence crumbles; between her and the universe there is no longer any need for a masculine mediator. . . .

When she is productive, active, she regains her transcendence; in her projects she concretely affirms her status as subject; in connection with the aims she pursues, with the money and the rights she takes possession of, she makes trial of and senses her responsibility. . . .

There are . . . a fairly large number of privileged women who find in their professions a means of economic and social autonomy. These come to mind when one considers woman’s possibilities and her future. . . . [E]ven though they constitute

as yet only a minority; they continue to be the subject of debate between feminists and antifeminists. The latter assert that the emancipated women of today succeed in doing nothing of importance in the world and that furthermore they have difficulty in achieving their own inner equilibrium. The former exaggerate the results obtained by professional women and are blind to their inner confusion. There is no good reason . . . to say they are on the wrong road; and still it is certain that they are not tranquilly installed in their new realm: as yet they are only halfway there. The woman who is economically emancipated from man is not for all that in a moral, social, and psychological situation identical with that of man. The way she carried on her profession and her devotion to it depends on the context supplied by the total pattern of her life. For when she begins her adult life she does not have behind her the same past as does a boy; she is not viewed by society in the same way; the universe presents itself to her in a different perspective. The fact of being a woman today poses peculiar problems for an independent human individual.



Women and children participating in a women's liberation protest in London in 1971. Shepard Sherbell/ORBIS

Women began to work to escape the boredom and isolation of housework. Most often, however, working women continue to be responsible for maintaining the household and caring for children, leading to what has been called the "double burden," or work side and outside the home.

Women in some European countries, such as Norway, have demanded that the state provide support for working mothers that will guarantee sufficient child care for them to work with the same degree of flexibility and opportunity as men with children. Advocates of enhanced child-care provisions used campaigns, protests, and rallies to pressure parliament to address the issue in the 1980s. Some Norwegians demanded equal access to child-care facilities, while others wanted state-funded home care allowances to pay for women to stay home with young children. Many feminists consider such home-care allowances to threaten gender equality in the workplace, and argue that they constitute pressure on women to stay home with young children.

New Work Patterns

The work pattern of European women has been far more consistent in the twentieth century than it had been in the nineteenth. Single women enter the workforce after their schooling and continue to work after marriage. They may stop working to care for their young children, but they return to work when the children begin school. For many women, however, returning to work is combined with fewer opportunities for professional advancement, limited hours, and unequal pay for the same work done by a male counterpart.

When women died relatively young, childrearing filled a large proportion of their lives. As a longer lifespan has shortened that proportion, women throughout the West are seeking ways to lead satisfying lives after their children have grown. Decisions about when to have children and how many have also shaped the

late twentieth-century work patterns for women. Many women have begun to limit the number of children they bear or to forgo childbearing and childrearing altogether. The age at which women have decided to bear children has risen, to the early twenties in Eastern Europe and to the late twenties in Western Europe. In urban areas, women have fewer children and have them later in life than rural women do.

Women in the New Eastern Europe

Under communism, women generally enjoyed social equality, as well as a broad spectrum of government-financed benefits. Most women (normally well over 50 percent) worked in these societies, both because they could and because they were expected to. No significant women's movements existed, however, because communist governments regarded them with suspicion, as they did all independent associations.

The new governments of the region are free but have shown little concern with women's issues. Indeed, the economic difficulties the new governments face may endanger their funding of health and welfare programs that benefit women and children. For example, a free market economy may limit the extensive maternity benefits upon which Eastern European women previously depended. Moreover, the high proportion of women in the workforce could leave them more vulnerable than men to the region's economic troubles. Women may be laid off before men and hired later than men for lower pay.

How was cultural and intellectual life transformed in Europe during the twentieth century?

▼ Transformations in Knowledge and Culture

Knowledge and culture in Europe were rapidly transformed in the twentieth century. Institutions of higher education enrolled a larger and more diverse student body, making knowledge more widely available than ever before. Also, movements such as existentialism challenged traditional intellectual attitudes. Environmental concerns also raised new issues. Throughout this ferment, representatives of the Christian faith tried to keep their religion relevant.

Communism and Western Europe

Until the final decade of the twentieth century, Western Europe had large, organized communist parties, as well as groups of intellectuals sympathetic to communism. After the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Revolution and the subsequent civil war, the Western European socialist movement divided into independent democratic socialist parties and Soviet-dominated communist parties that followed the dictates of the Third International. In the 1920s and 1930s, those two groups fought each other with only rare moments of cooperation, such as that achieved during the French Popular Front in 1936.


The Intellectuals During the 1930s, as liberal democracies floundered in the face of the Great Depression and as right-wing regimes spread across the Continent, many people saw communism as a vehicle for protecting humane and even liberal values. European university students were often affiliated with the Communist Party. They and older intellectuals visited the Soviet Union and praised what they saw as Stalin's achievements. Many of these intellectuals did not know about Stalin's terror. Others simply closed their eyes to it, believing humane ends might come from inhumane methods. One group of former communists, writing after World War II, described their attraction toward, and later disillusionment with, communism in a book titled *The God That Failed* (1949).

Four events proved crucial to the intellectuals' disillusionment: the great Soviet public purge trials of the late 1930s, the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the

Nazi–Soviet pact of 1939, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Arthur Koestler's (1905–1983) novel *Darkness at Noon* (1940) recorded a former communist's view of the purges. George Orwell (1903–1950), who had never been a communist but who had sympathized with the party, expressed his disappointment with Stalin's policy in Spain in *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). The Nazi–Soviet pact damaged Stalin's image as an opponent of fascism. Other intellectuals, such as French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), continued to believe in the Soviet Union during and after the war, but the Hungarian Revolution cooled their ardor. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 confirmed a general disillusionment with Soviet policies by left-wing Western European intellectuals.

Yet disillusionment with the Soviet Union or with Stalin did not mean disillusionment with Marxism or with radical socialist criticisms of European society. Some writers and social critics looked to the establishment of alternative communist governments based on non-Soviet models. During the decade after World War II, Yugoslavia provided such an example. Beginning in the late 1950s, radical students and a few intellectuals found inspiration in the Chinese Revolution. Other groups hoped a European Marxist system would develop. Among the more important contributors to this non-Soviet tradition was the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), especially in his work *Letters from Prison* (published posthumously in 1947). The thinking of such non-Soviet communists became important to Western European communist parties, such as the Italian Communist Party, that hoped to gain office democratically.

Another way to accommodate Marxism within mid-twentieth-century European thought was to re-define the basic message of Marx himself. During the 1930s, many of Marx's previously unprinted essays were published. These books and articles, written before the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, are abstract and philosophical. They show how the "young Marx" belonged more to the humanist than to the revolutionary tradition of European thought. Since World War II, works such as *Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844 and *German Ideology* have been widely read. Today, many people are more familiar with them than with the *Manifesto* or *Capital*. They allowed people to separate Marxism from revolutionary violence or support of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the communist governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Marxism's influence on European intellectual life seemed to wane. The financial crisis of the twenty-first century has led some intellectuals to turn their attention back to Marx's critique of capitalism, even if they do not defend his vision of a communist alternative. Whether doubts about the functioning of the free market will lead to a resurgence in Marxism's influence remains uncertain.



George Orwell (1903–1950), shown here with his son, was an English writer of socialist sympathies who wrote major works opposing Stalin and communist authoritarianism. Felix H. Man/Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz

Existentialism

The intellectual movement that perhaps best captured the predicament and mood of mid-twentieth-century European culture was **existentialism**. Like the modern Western mind in general, existentialism, which has been termed the "philosophy of Europe in the twentieth century," was badly divided; most of the philosophers

existentialism The post–World War II Western philosophy that holds human beings are totally responsible for their acts and that this responsibility causes them dread and anguish.

associated with it disagreed with each other on major issues. The movement represented, in part, a continuation of the revolt against reason that began in the nineteenth century.

Roots in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), discussed in Chapter 16, was a major forerunner of existentialism. Another was Danish writer Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), who received little attention until after World War I. Kierkegaard was a rebel against both Hegelian philosophy and Danish Lutheranism. In works such as *Fear and Trembling* (1843), *Either/Or* (1843), and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846), he maintained that the truth of Christianity could be grasped only in the lives of those who faced extreme situations, not in creeds, doctrines, and church structures.

Kierkegaard also criticized Hegelian philosophy and, by implication, all academic rational philosophy. Philosophy's failure, he felt, was the attempt to contain life and human experience within abstract categories.

The intellectual and ethical crisis of World War I led many people to doubt whether human beings were actually in control of their own destiny. Its destructiveness challenged faith in human rationality and improvement. Indeed, the war's most terrible weapons—poison gas, machine guns, submarines, high explosives—were the products of rational technology. The pride in rational human achievement that had characterized nineteenth-century European civilization lay in ruins.

Questioning of Rationalism Existentialist thought thrived in this climate and received further support from the trauma of World War II. The major existential writers included the Germans Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) and the French Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and Albert Camus (1913–1960). Although they frequently disagreed with each other, they all questioned the primacy of reason and scientific understanding as ways to come to grips with the human situation. Heidegger, a philosopher deeply compromised by his association with the Nazis, argued, "Thinking only begins at the point where we have come to know that Reason, glorified for centuries, is the most obstinate adversary of thinking."³

The Romantic writers of the early nineteenth century had also questioned the primacy of reason, but their criticisms were much less radical than those of the existentialists. The Romantics emphasized the imagination and intuition, but the existentialists dwelled primarily on the extremes of human experience. Death, fear, and anxiety provided their themes. The titles of their works illustrate their sense of foreboding and alienation: *Being and Time* (1927), by Heidegger; *Nausea* (1938) and *Being and Nothingness* (1943), by Sartre; *The Stranger* (1942) and *The Plague* (1947), by Camus. The touchstone of philosophic truth became the experience of the individual under extreme conditions.

According to the existentialists, human beings are compelled to formulate their own ethical values and cannot depend on traditional religion, rational philosophy, intuition, or social customs for ethical guidance. The opportunity and need to define values endow humans with a dreadful freedom. The existentialists protested against a world in which reason, technology, and politics produced war and genocide. Their thought reflected the uncertainty of social institutions and ethical values in the era of the two world wars.

Expansion of the University Population and Student Rebellion

As rapid changes in communications technology vastly expanded access to information, more Europeans received some form of university education. In 1900, only a few thousand people were enrolled in universities in any major European country, and

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"The Big Picture: The World in 2015 C.E." on MyHistoryLab.com

³William Barrett, *Irrational Man* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), p. 20.



Students and young people protested against the Vietnam War throughout Europe. This demonstration in Paris was led by a Communist organization that opposed both the United States action in the war and France's own imperialist history in former Indochina. © Bettmann/CORBIS

only rarely were women allowed access to higher education. By 2010, that figure had risen to hundreds of thousands. Over one-third of Europeans in their thirties have had a university education, and women are more likely to attend university than men.

One of the most striking and unexpected results of this rising post-World War II population of students and intellectuals was the student rebellion of the 1960s. Student uprisings began in the early 1960s in the United States and grew with opposition to the war in Vietnam. The student rebellion then spread into Europe and other parts of the world. It was almost always associated with a radical political critique of the United States, although Eastern European students resented the Soviet Union even more. The movement was generally antimilitarist. Students also questioned middle-class values and traditional sexual mores and family life.

The student movement peaked in 1968, when American students demonstrated forcibly against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In the same year, students at the Sorbonne in Paris almost brought down the government of Charles de Gaulle, and in Czechoslovakia, students were in the forefront of the liberal socialist experiment. These protests failed to have an immediate effect on the policies of the governments at which they were directed. The United States stayed in Vietnam until 1973, de Gaulle remained president of France for another year, and the Soviets suppressed the Czech experiment.

By the early 1970s, the era of student rebellion seemed to have passed. Students remained active in European movements against nuclear weapons and particularly against the placement of American nuclear weapons in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. From the mid-1970s, however, although often remaining political radicals, they generally abandoned the disruptive protests that had marked the 1960s.

The Americanization of Europe

During the past half-century, through the Marshall Plan, the leadership of NATO, the stationing of huge military bases, student exchanges, popular culture, and tourism, the United States has exerted enormous influence on Western Europe. The pejorative

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SARTRE DISCUSSES HIS EXISTENTIALISM



Jean-Paul Sartre, dramatist, novelist, and philosopher, was the most important French existentialist. In the first paragraph of this 1946 statement, Sartre asserted that all human beings must experience a sense of anguish or the most extreme anxiety when undertaking a major commitment. That anguish arises because, consciously or unconsciously, they are deciding whether all human beings should make the same decision. In the second paragraph, Sartre argued that the existence or nonexistence of God would make no difference in human affairs. Humankind must discover the character of its own situation by itself.

How might the experiences of fascism in Europe and the fall of France to the Nazis have led Sartre to emphasize the need of human beings to choose? Why does Sartre believe existentialism must be related to atheism? Why did Sartre regard existentialism as optimistic?

The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish. His meaning is as follows—When a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind—in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. There are many, indeed, who show no such anxiety. But we affirm that they are merely disguising their anguish or are in flight from it. Certainly, many people think that in what they are doing they commit no one but themselves to anything: and if you ask them, “What would happen if everyone did so?,” they shrug their shoulders and reply, “Everyone does not do so.” But in truth, one ought always to ask oneself what would happen if everyone did as one is doing; nor can one escape from that disturbing thought except by a kind of self-deception. The man who lies in self-excuse, by saying, “Everyone will not do it” must be ill at ease in his conscience, for the act of lying implies the

universal value which it denies. By its very disguise his anguish reveals itself.

Existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position. Its intention is not in the least that of plunging men into despair. And if by despair one means—as the Christians do—any attitude of unbelief, the despair of the existentialist is something different. Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstration of the nonexistence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. In this sense existentialism is optimistic. It is a doctrine of action, and it is only by self-deception, by confusing their own despair with ours, that Christians can describe us as without hope.

From Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, trans. by Philip Mairet (London: Methuen), in Walter Kaufman, ed., *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 292, 310–311.

term *Americanization* refers, in part, to this economic and military influence, but also to concerns about cultural loss. Many Europeans feel that American popular entertainment, companies, and business methods threaten to extinguish Europe's unique qualities. Many American firms now have European branches. Large American corporations, such as McDonald's, Starbucks, Apple, and Gap, have outlets in European cities from Dublin to Moscow. American liquor companies and distilleries now sell their goods in Europe. Casual American clothing, such as blue jeans and baseball caps, is ubiquitous in Europe. Shopping centers and supermarkets, first pioneered in America, are displacing neighborhood markets in European cities. American

television programs, movies, computer games, and rock and rap music are readily available. Furthermore, as Europe moves toward greater economic cooperation, English has become the common language of business, technology, and even some academic fields—and it is American English, not British. (See “Encountering, the Past: Toys from Europe Conquer the United States,” page 852.)

 **Watch the Video** “Video Lectures: Imperialism and the United States” on MyHistoryLab.com

A Consumer Society

Although European economies came under pressure during the 1990s and experienced high levels of unemployment, the consumer sector has expanded to an extraordinary degree during most of the last half-century.

The consumer orientation of the Western European economy emerged as one of the most important characteristics differentiating it from Eastern Europe. Those differences produced political results. In the Soviet Union and the nations it dominated in Eastern Europe, economic planning overwhelmingly favored capital investment and military production. These nations produced inadequate and low-quality consumer goods. Long lines for staples, such as food and clothing, were common. Automobiles were a luxury. Housing did not permit the luxury of privacy, and children were often forced to live with their parents well into adulthood.

By contrast, by the early 1950s, Western Europeans enjoyed an expansion of consumer goods and services. Automobile ownership has soared. Refrigerators, washing machines, electric ranges, televisions, microwaves, videocassette recorders, cameras, computers, CD players, DVD players, and other electronic consumer items are taken for granted. Like their American counterparts, Western Europeans now have a whole gamut of products, such as disposable diapers and prepared baby foods, to help them raise children. They take foreign vacations year round, prompting the expansion of ski resorts in the Alps and beach resorts on the Mediterranean.

This vast expansion of consumerism, which, as we noted in Chapter 7, began in the eighteenth century, became a defining characteristic of Western Europe in the late twentieth century. It stood in marked contrast to the consumer shortages in Eastern Europe. Yet through even the limited number of radios, televisions, movies, and videos available to them, people in the East grew increasingly aware of the discrepancy between their lifestyle and that of the West. They associated Western consumerism with democratic governments, free societies, and economic policies that favored the free market. Thus, the expansion of consumerism in the West, which many intellectuals and moralists deplored, helped generate the discontent that brought down communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Environmentalism

After World War II, shortages of consumer goods created a demand that fueled post-war economic reconstruction and growth into the 1950s and 1960s. In those expansive times, public debate about the ethics of economic expansion and efficiency and their effects on the environment was muted. Concerns about pollution began to grow in the 1970s, and by the 1980s, environmentalists had developed real political clout. Among the most important environmental groups were the German Greens. The Greens formed a political party in 1979 that immediately became an electoral force. During these same years, concern for environmental issues, such as global warming and the pollution of water and the atmosphere, commanded the attention of governments outside Europe and of the United Nations.

Several developments lay behind this new concern for the environment. The Arab oil embargo of 1973–1974 pressed home two messages to the industrialized West: natural resources are limited, and foreign, potentially hostile, countries control critical resources. By the 1970s, too, the environmental consequences of three decades of economic expansion were becoming increasingly apparent. Fish were dying in the Thames River in England. Industrial pollution was destroying life in the Rhine River

 **Read the Document** “Towards a Green Europe, Towards a Green World” on MyHistoryLab.com

TOYS FROM EUROPE CONQUER THE UNITED STATES

TODAY MANY EUROPEANS criticize what they term *Americanization*—the intrusion of popular American products and restaurant chains onto the European scene. Yet over the past half-century one European toy—LEGO building blocks manufactured in Denmark—has shaped the experience of childhood for many children in the United States and the rest of the world, entering their lives and imaginations no less powerfully than the cartoon figures associated with the American Disney Corporation.

In 1932, in the midst of the depression, Ole Kirk Christiansen opened a small business in Billund, Denmark, that manufactured household goods and wooden toys. The toys sold so well that two years later the firm renamed itself LEGO from the Danish *LEg GOdt*, meaning “play well.” The company remained small, producing only wooden toys, until 1947 when it began to make molded plastic toys. It only sold its products in Denmark.

In 1955, LEGO introduced LEGO Bricks—plastic building blocks of the familiar stud-and-tube type—that it sold in sets under the name LEGO System of Play. That system, which the firm patented in 1958, allowed children to combine LEGO Bricks in an almost endless number of ways, limited only by their own imaginations and that of their parents. The company also

extended its market across and began to sell in the United States in 1961.

Thereafter, the success of LEGO as a toy and as a company fed on itself. The company added many new features to the original concept of interlocking building blocks. For example, wheels enabled children to use LEGO kits to build their own trucks, trains, and similar mobile toys.

In 1968, the LEGO Company, no doubt following the example of the Disney Corporation in the United States, opened an amusement park in Billund in which the rides were designed to look like huge LEGO toys. By the end of the century, LEGO had opened similar parks in England, the United States, and Germany.

However, the company remained focused on making toys for children. It designed new toys, such as plastic figures with human heads to ride in LEGO vehicles, and whole LEGO villages, castles, and pirate ships. By the 1990s, LEGO had become the largest toy manufacturer in Europe and a part of modern culture. Museums displayed LEGO products and art built from LEGO blocks. Contests were held to construct the largest or most unusual LEGO structures. In 1999, *Fortune* magazine included the LEGO Brick among the “Products of the Century,” and in 2002, LEGO persuaded European and American management consultants that working with LEGO blocks would help business executives think more clearly about corporate planning. Perhaps most astonishing is that during a half-century of tumultuous change, children around the world have continued to play with these little pieces of plastic.



Children across the world play with LEGO toys. Tom Prettyman/PhotoEdit

Factual information derived from the official Lego Group Web site at www.lego.com/eng/info/history.

How has LEGO been an example of the European penetration of popular culture around the world?

Why has the influence of LEGO on children's toys been less controversial than the appearance of American fast-food chains in Europe?



Workers who participated in the clean-up after the Chernobyl disaster protest in front of riot police in Lviv, Ukraine, in November 2011. The government slashed the pensions and social benefits given to them after the clean-up. Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA/Newscom

between Germany and France. Acid rain was killing trees from Sweden to Germany. Finally, long-standing worries about nuclear weapons merged with concerns about their environmental effects, strengthening antinuclear groups and generating opposition to the placement of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The German **Green movement** originated among radical student groups in the late 1960s. Like them, it was anticapitalist, blaming business for pollution. The Greens and other European environmental groups were also strongly antinuclear. Unlike the students of the 1960s, the Greens avoided violence and mass demonstrations, seeking instead to become a significant political presence through the electoral process.


The 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union heightened concern about environmental issues and raised questions that no European government could ignore. The Soviet government had to confront casualties at the site and relocate tens of thousands of people. Radioactive fallout spread across Europe. Environmentalists had always contended that their issues transcended national borders. The Chernobyl fire proved them right.

After Chernobyl, European governments, East and West, began to respond to environmental concerns. Some observers believe the environment may become a major political issue across the Continent. In Western Europe, environmental groups command many votes. Economic and political integration opens the possibility of transnational cooperation on environmental matters. As the European Economic Community solidifies, it and its member nations will likely impose more environmental regulations on business and industry. The nations of Eastern Europe have been forced to face the cleanup of vast areas of industrial development polluted during the communist era and to try to combine environmental protection with economic growth.

Art Since World War II

It is impossible to cover even briefly the expansive and varied world of Western art since the end of World War II. However, we can note how both the Cold War and the memory of the horrors of World War II influenced Western art.

Green movement A political environmentalist movement that began in West Germany in the 1970s and spread to a number of other Western nations.

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How did the Cold War shape Western art in the second half of the twentieth century?

Document

VOICES FROM CHERNOBYL



The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, Ukraine, affected some towns in bordering Belarus as profoundly as it did parts of Ukraine. Journalist Svetlana Alexievich traveled through villages in the affected region in 1996, ten years after the disaster, and interviewed hundreds of survivors. The first of the two excerpts comes from an interview of the wife of a “liquidator,” one of the firemen sent as first responders to put out the fire at the nuclear plant. She describes her husband’s last days in a hospital in Moscow. The second excerpt comes from an interview with an elderly resident of one of the villages closest to the plant who refused to evacuate despite warnings that the area was unsafe.

Why was it difficult for people to understand the hazards of radiation? Why might someone choose to stay in Chernobyl? How might the memory of World War II have affected the way people responded to the catastrophe? What sort of information about the hazards of radiation was made available to local residents?

“I go back to the hospital and there’s an orange on the bedside table. A big one, and pink. He’s smiling: ‘I got a gift. Take it.’ Meanwhile the nurse is gesturing through the film that I can’t eat it. It’s been near him a while, so not only can you not eat it, you shouldn’t even touch it. ‘Come on, eat it,’ he says. ‘You like oranges.’ I take the orange in my hand. Meanwhile he shuts his eyes and goes to sleep. They were always giving him shots to put him to sleep. The nurse is looking at me in horror. And me? I’m ready to do whatever it takes so that he doesn’t think about death. And about the fact that his death is horrible, that I’m afraid of him. There’s a fragment of some conversation, I’m remembering it. Someone is saying: ‘you have to understand, this is not your husband anymore, not a beloved person, but a radioactive object with a strong density of poisoning. You’re not suicidal. Get ahold of yourself.’ And I’m like someone who’s lost her mind.”

—Lyudmilla Ignatenko

“We weren’t too afraid of this radiation. We couldn’t see it, and we didn’t know what it was, maybe we were a little afraid, but once we’d seen it, we weren’t so afraid. The police and the soldiers put up these signs. Some were next to people’s houses, some were in the street—they’d write,

70 curie, 60 curie. We’d always lived off our potatoes, and then suddenly—we’re not allowed to! For some people it was real bad for others it was funny. They advised us to work in our gardens in masks and rubber gloves. And then another big scientist came to the meeting hall and told us that we needed to wash our yards. Come on! I couldn’t believe what I was hearing! They ordered us to wash our sheets, our blankets, our curtains. But they’re in storage! In closets and trunks. There’s no radiation in there! Behind glass? Behind closed doors? Come on! It’s in the forest, in the field. They closed the wells, locked them up, wrapped them in cellophane. Said the water was ‘dirty.’ How can it be dirty when it’s so clean? They told us a bunch of nonsense. You’ll die. You need to leave. Evacuate. . . .

And then I hear about how the soldiers were evacuating one village, and this old man and woman stayed. Until then, when people were roused up and put on buses, they’d take their cow and go into the forest. They’d wait there. Like during the war, when they were burning down the villages. Why would our soldiers chase us? . . .

And why should I leave? It’s nice here! Everything grows, everything blooming. From the littlest fly to the animals, everything’s living.”


—Zinaida Yevdokimovna Kovalenko



Tatjana Yablonskaya, *Bread*, 1949. Ria Novosti/Sovfoto/Eastfoto

Cultural Divisions and the Cold War

The stark differences between Soviet painter Tatjana Yablonskaya's (b. 1917) sun-strewn *Bread* (1949) and the American Jackson Pollock's (1912–1956) dizzyingly abstract *One (Number 31, 1950)* mirror the cultural divisions of the early Cold War.




Jackson Pollock, *One (Number 31, 1950)*. Oil and enamel on unprimed canvas, 8 ft. 10 in. × 17 ft. 5 5/8 in. (269.5 × 530.8 cm). The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by Scala-Art Resource, NY. Sidney and Harriet Janis Collection Fund (by exchange). Photograph © 2000 The Museum of Modern Art, New York. 00007.68. © 2004 The Pollock-Krasner Foundation/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

A Closer **LOOK**View the Closer Look on [MyHistoryLab.com](#)

NAMELESS LIBRARY, VIENNA

BRITISH SCULPTOR Rachel Whiteread (b. 1963) is one of the leading artists of today's Europe. Her work illustrates how European art is breaking out of the modernist contours that were set at the beginning of the twentieth century. On one hand, Whiteread's art returns to what seem like familiar forms; on the other, it forces us to view these forms in ways that are as new to us as cubism was to the public in its day.

Whiteread's work is associated with minimalism in contemporary art. This movement, which originated in architecture and interior design, seeks to remove from the object being portrayed as many features as possible while retaining the object's form and the viewer's interest. Minimalist art aims to be as understated as possible. In Whiteread's hands, the minimal becomes the austere, and her work often exudes melancholy and loss.



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Whiteread's most important public work, and one designed to endure, is *Nameless Library*, the Judenplatz Holocaust Memorial in Vienna, which commemorates the deaths of 65,000 Austrian Jews under the Nazis. This memorial, which resembles a vast haunting tomb, is cast in concrete and embodies the outline of books whose spines are turned inward, thus remaining forever unread and as unopenable as the library's huge concrete doors.

Who is the intended audience for this piece of work? Viennese? Tourists? How do you imagine different people respond to *Nameless Library*?

Whiteread has said the molded, unopened books, which have been compared to the ghost of a library, symbolize the loss both of Jewish contributions to culture and of Jewish lives in the Holocaust.

***Nameless Library* stands in Vienna's Judenplatz, in the center of its former Jewish district. It is surrounded by outdoor cafés and restaurants. What makes this an especially appropriate or inappropriate location for such a memorial?**

Bread, measuring over six feet high and twelve feet wide, is a monumental example of **socialist realism**. Established as the official doctrine of Soviet art and literature in 1934, socialist realism sought to create optimistic and easily intelligible scenes of a bold socialist future, in which prosperity and solidarity would reign. Manual laborers and prominent historical and political figures were painted in a traditional and often rigid figurative manner. Socialist realism became the dominant artistic model throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, only waning when Nikita Khrushchev liberalized Soviet cultural policy in the late 1950s.

Pollock's paintings are central documents of postwar American cultural life. Flinging paint from sticks and brushes onto his floor-bound canvas, Pollock freed his lines from representing any figure or outline. The result, in *One* (Number 31, 1950), which is over eight feet high and seventeen feet wide, is a writhing tangle of pure visual energy. In the politically charged atmosphere of the early Cold War, critics saw Pollock's exuberant "drip" paintings as the embodiment of American cultural freedom and celebrated the Wyoming-born Pollock as a kind of artist cowboy.

As skeptical as many viewers might have been about the merits of abstract art (*Time* magazine, for instance, dismissed Pollock as "Jack the dripper" in 1947), many people in the West saw it as the antithesis of the restrictions the dominance of socialist realism placed on individual creativity.

Indeed, New York City—not Paris—emerged as the international center of modern art after World War II. As the home of growing collections of twentieth-century art and dozens of European artists who had fled from the Nazis, New York became a fertile training ground for young artists such as Pollock. Just as American political and economic structures became models for the postwar redevelopment of Western Europe, so did American cultural developments. By the time Pollock's first posthumous retrospective toured Europe in 1958, much European painting resembled an elegant imitation of his frenetic lines.

Yablonskaya and Pollock together illustrate the two central poles of twentieth-century art: realism and abstraction. Although artistic style is no longer as closely associated with political programs as it once was, these two poles still frame the work of countless artists today.

socialist realism Established as the official doctrine of Soviet art and literature in 1934, it sought to create optimistic and easily intelligible scenes of a bold socialist future, in which prosperity and solidarity would reign.

▼ The Christian Heritage

In most ways, Christianity in Europe has continued to be as hard-pressed during the twentieth century as it had been in the late nineteenth. Material prosperity, political ideologies, environmentalism, gender politics, and simple indifference have replaced religious faith for many people. Still, despite the loss of much of their popular support and legal privileges and the low rates of church attendance, the European Christian churches continue to exercise social and political influence. In Germany, the churches were one of the few major institutions that the Nazis did not wholly subdue. Lutheran clergy, such as Martin Niemöller (1892–1984) and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945), were leaders of the opposition to Hitler. After the war, most especially in Poland but also elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Roman Catholic Church opposed communism. In Eastern and Western Europe, even in this most secular of ages, Christian churches have influenced state and society.

How has the Christian heritage of the West been affected by events of the twentieth century?

Neo-Orthodoxy

Liberal theologians of the nineteenth century often softened the concept of sin and portrayed human nature as close to the divine. The horror of World War I destroyed that optimistic faith. Many Europeans felt that evil had stalked the Continent.

The most important Christian response to World War I appeared in the theology of Karl Barth (1886–1968). In 1919, this Swiss pastor published *A Commentary on*

the *Epistle to the Romans*, which reemphasized the transcendence of God and the dependence of humankind on the divine. Barth portrayed God as wholly other than, and different from, humankind. In a sense, Barth was returning to the Reformation theology of Luther, but the work of Kierkegaard had profoundly influenced his reading of the reformer. Those extreme moments of life Kierkegaard described provided the basis for a knowledge of humanity's need for God.

This view challenged much nineteenth-century writing about human nature. Barth's theology, which came to be known as neo-Orthodoxy, proved influential throughout the West in the wake of new disasters and suffering.

Liberal Theology

Neo-Orthodoxy did not, however, sweep away liberal theology, which had a strong advocate in Paul Tillich (1886–1965). This German American theologian tended to regard religion as a human, rather than a divine, phenomenon.

Other liberal theologians, such as Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), continued to work on the problems of naturalism and supernaturalism that had troubled earlier writers. Bultmann's major writing took place before World War II but was popularized after the war by the Anglican bishop John Robinson in *Honest to God* (1963). Another liberal Christian writer from Britain, C. S. Lewis (1878–1963), attracted millions of readers during and after World War II. This layman and scholar of medieval literature often expressed his thoughts on theology in the form of letters and short stories.


Roman Catholic Reform

Among Christian denominations, the most significant postwar changes have been in the Roman Catholic Church. Pope John XXIII (r. 1958–1963) initiated these changes, the most extensive in Catholicism for more than a century and, some would say, since the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century. In 1959, Pope John XXIII summoned the Twenty-First Ecumenical Council, which came to be called Vatican II. The council finished its work in 1965 under John's successor, Pope Paul VI (r. 1963–1978). Among many changes in Catholic liturgy the council introduced, Mass was now celebrated in the vernacular languages rather than in Latin. The council also encouraged freer relations with other Christian denominations, fostered a new spirit toward Judaism, and gave more power to bishops. In recognition of the growing importance to the church of the world outside Europe and North America, Pope Paul VI appointed several cardinals from the former colonial nations, transforming the church into a truly world body.

In contrast to these liberal changes, however, Pope Paul VI and his successors have firmly upheld the celibacy of priests, maintained the church's prohibition on contraception and abortion, and opposed moves to open the priesthood to women. The church's unyielding stand on clerical celibacy has caused many men to leave the priesthood and many men and women to leave religious orders. The laity has widely ignored the prohibition on contraception.

John Paul II, the former Karol Wojtyła, archbishop of Kraków in Poland, was elected in 1978 after the death of John Paul I, whose reign lasted only thirty-four days. The youngest pope since Pius IX (r. 1846–1878) and the first non-Italian pope since the sixteenth century, John Paul II (1920–2005) pursued a three-pronged policy during his long pontificate. First, he maintained traditionalist doctrine, stressing the authority of the papacy and attempting to limit doctrinal and liturgical experimentation.

Second, taking a firm stand against communism, he supported resistance to the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As a cardinal in Poland, he had clashed with the communist government. After his election, he visited Poland, lending support to Solidarity. His Polish origins helped make him an important factor in the popular resistance to Eastern Europe's communist governments that developed during the 1980s. He thus opened a new chapter in the relationship between church and state in modern Europe.

 **Read the Document**
"Pope John Paul II, from
Centesimus Annus" on
MyHistoryLab.com

Third, John Paul II encouraged the growth of the church in the non-Western world, stressing the need for social justice but limiting the political activity of priests. The pope's concern for the expansion of Roman Catholicism beyond Europe and North America recognized and encouraged what appears to be a transformation in Christianity as a world religion. Whereas in Europe, Christian observance had declined sharply during the twentieth century, Christianity has grown rapidly and fervently in Africa and Latin America. By 2010, only about a quarter of the world's Christians lived in Europe; another quarter lived in sub-Saharan Africa, and well over one-third lived in North and South America. Recognizing these changes, John Paul II created more cardinals from non-Western nations.

John Paul II died in 2005. His successor was his closest collaborator, the German Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (b. 1927), who took the name Benedict XVI. The new pope has followed his predecessor in his rigorous defense of orthodoxy. In September 2006 he delivered a speech in which he quoted a medieval writer criticizing Islam. The speech provoked considerable criticism in Europe and provoked riots in parts of the Islamic world. Pope Benedict XVI has also championed the role of religious freedom for Christians and other religiously observant peoples living in the midst of secular societies.



Throughout his pontificate John Paul II continued a close relationship with his native Poland to which he made several visits. The earliest of these, in June 1979, was important in demonstrating the authority of the church against Polish communist authorities. The Pope is shown here at one of several outdoor masses he held in Poland, this one in Czestochowa in southwestern Poland. In one of his sermons, he said "Poland in our time has become a land called to give an especially important witness." Associated Press

What impact has the computer had on twentieth-century society?

▼ Late Twentieth-Century Technology: The Arrival of the Computer

During the twentieth century, technology crossed international borders the way popular culture did. As with other areas of European life and society, American technology had an unprecedented impact on the Continent, whether in the guise of the first airplanes or Henry Ford's method of producing affordable automobiles. It seems certain, however, that no single American technological achievement of the twentieth century will so influence Western life on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as throughout the rest of the world, as the computer.

The Demand for Calculating Machines

Beginning in the seventeenth century, thinkers associated with the scientific revolution—most famously, French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)—attempted to construct machines that would carry out mathematical calculations that human beings would find essentially impossible because of the tedium and the amount of time they involved. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the governments of the consolidating nation-states of Europe and of the United States confronted new administrative tasks that involved collecting and organizing vast amounts of data about national censuses, tax collection, economic statistics, and the administration of pensions and welfare legislation. During the same years, private businesses sought calculating machinery to handle and organize growing amounts of economic and business data. Such machines became technologically possible through the development of complex circuitry for electricity, the most versatile mode of energy in human history. Moreover, inventions that were dependent on electricity, including the telephone, the telegraph, underwater cables, and the wireless, created a new communications industry that also required the organization of large databases of customer information to deliver their services. By the late 1920s, companies like National Cash Register, Remington Rand, and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) had begun to manufacture such business machinery.


Early Computer Technology

As has happened so often in history, warfare was the chief catalyst of change. After World War I and during World War II, the major powers developed new weapons that required exact mathematical ballistic calculations to strike targets with bombs delivered by aircraft or long-range guns.

The first machine genuinely recognizable as a modern digital computer was the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), built and designed at Moore Laboratories of the University of Pennsylvania and put into use by the U.S. Army in 1946 for ballistics calculation. The ENIAC was an enormous piece of equipment with 40 panels, 1,500 electric relays, and 18,000 vacuum tubes. It also used thousands of punch cards, and a separate tabulator had to print the data from them. Further computer engineering occurred at the Institute for Advanced Research in Princeton, New Jersey, in laboratories at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and in other laboratories the U.S. government and private businesses, especially IBM, ran. The other primary sites for computer development were laboratories in Britain.

The Development of Desktop Computers

During the 1950s, however, the transistor revolutionized electronics, permitting a miniaturization of circuitry that made vacuum tubes obsolete and allowed computers to become smaller. Computers still had to be programmed with difficult computer languages by persons expertly trained to use them.



The earliest computers were very large. Here in a 1946 photograph, J. Presper Eckert and J. W. Mauchly stand by the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), which was dedicated at the University of Pennsylvania Moore School of Electrical Engineering. CORBIS/Bettmann

By the late 1960s, however, two innovations transformed computing technology. First, control of the computer was transferred to a bitmap covering the screen of a computer monitor. The mouse, invented in 1964, eased the movement of the cursor around the computer screen. Second, engineers at the Intel Corporation—then a California start-up company—invented the microchip, which became the heart of all future computers.

The bitmap on the screen, operated through the mouse, in effect embedded complicated computer language in the machine, hidden from the user, who simply manipulated images on the screen with the mouse. Almost anyone could thus learn to operate computers. At the same time, the tiny microchip, itself a miniature computer or microprocessor, permitted computer technology to abandon the mainframe and move to still smaller computers. At the Xerox Corporation, engineers devised a small computer using a mouse, but the machine never achieved commercial success. By 1982, IBM had produced a small personal computer but temporarily lost the race for commercialization to a then small company called Apple Computer Corporation. The design features originally developed at Xerox informed the ideas of the Apple engineers, who, in early 1984, produced a small, highly accessible, commercially successful computer, known as the Macintosh, that would fit on a desktop in the home or office. IBM soon adopted the Apple concept with different engineering and marketing approaches and manufactured a product called the Personal Computer, or PC. By the mid-1980s, for a relatively modest cost (and one that has continued to drop), individuals had available for their own personal use in their offices or homes computers with far more power than the old mainframes. The Apple Macintosh and the IBM PC transformed computers into objects of everyday life and, in doing so, began to transform everyday life itself. Nonetheless, the chief contemporary users of computers remain governments followed by the telephone industry, banking and finance, automobile operation, and airline reservation systems.

Despite the potential democratizing character of computer technology, the computer revolution has also introduced new concepts of “haves” and “have-nots” to societies around the world. Computers, whatever their possible shortcomings, enable their users to do things that nonusers cannot do. Whether in poor school districts in the United States or in poor countries of the former Soviet bloc, students who graduate without computer skills will have difficulty making their way in the world’s rapidly computerizing economy. Some commentators also fear that boys are more likely than girls to receive technological training in computers. Nations whose governments and businesses become networked into the world of computers will prosper more fully than those whose access to computer technology is deficient. In that regard, the possession of computers and the ability to use them will probably determine future economic competition, just as they have determined recent military competition.

What led to Western European unification following World War II?

 **View the Image**
“European Union Flag” on
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▼ The Challenges of European Unification

The unprecedented steps toward economic cooperation and unity Western European nations took during the second half of the twentieth century were the single most important European success story of that era. The process originated from American encouragement in response to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and from the Western European states’ own sense that they lacked effective political and economic power. Furthermore, leaders in France and Germany who recoiled from the disastrous peace that followed World War I were determined that something different would arise from the political collapse of Europe after World War II. They understood that cooperation, rather than revenge, must inform the future of Europe.

Postwar Cooperation

The mid-twentieth-century Western European movement toward unity could have occurred in at least three ways: politically, militarily, or economically. Economic cooperation, unlike military and political cooperation, involved little or no immediate loss of sovereignty by the participating nations. Furthermore, it brought material benefits to all the states involved, increasing popular support for their governments. Moreover, the administration of the Marshall Plan and the organization of NATO gave the countries involved new experience in working with each other and demonstrated the productivity and efficiency that mutual cooperation could achieve.

The first effort toward economic cooperation was the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 by France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The community both benefited from and contributed to the immense growth of material production in Western Europe during this period. Its success reduced the suspicions of government and business groups about coordination and economic integration.

The European Economic Community

It took more than the prosperity of the European Coal and Steel Community to draw European leaders toward further unity, however. The unsuccessful Suez intervention of 1956 and the resulting diplomatic isolation of France and Britain persuaded many Europeans that only by acting together could they significantly influence the United States and the Soviet Union or control their own national and regional destinies. So, in 1957, through the Treaty of Rome, the six members of the Coal and Steel Community agreed to form a new organization: the **European Economic Community (EEC)**. The members of the Common Market, as the EEC was soon known, envisioned more than a free-trade union. They sought to achieve the eventual elimination of tariffs, a free flow of capital and labor, and similar wage and social benefits in all their countries.

European Economic Community (EEC) The economic association formed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1957. Also known as the *Common Market*.

The Common Market achieved stunning success during its early years. By 1968, well ahead of schedule, the six members had abolished all tariffs among themselves. Trade and labor migration among the members grew steadily. Moreover, nonmember states began to copy the EEC and, later, to seek to join it. In 1959, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal formed the European Free Trade Area. By 1961, however, Britain had decided to join the Common Market. Twice, in 1963 and 1967, President Charles de Gaulle of France vetoed British membership. He argued that Britain was too closely tied to the United States to support the EEC wholeheartedly. Finally, in 1973, Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark became members. Throughout the late 1970s, however, and into the 1980s, momentum for expanding EEC membership slowed. Norway and Sweden, with relatively strong economies, declined to join. Although in 1982, Spain, Portugal, and Greece applied for membership and were eventually admitted, sharp disagreements and a sense of stagnation within the EEC continued.

The European Union

In 1988, the leaders of the EEC reached an important decision. By 1992, the EEC was to be a virtual free-trade zone with no trade barriers or other restrictive trade policies among its members. In 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht made a series of specific proposals that led to a unified EEC currency (the euro) and a strong central bank. The treaty was submitted to referendums in several European states. Denmark initially rejected it, and it passed only narrowly in France and Great Britain, making clear that it needed wider popular support. When the treaty finally took effect in November 1993, the EEC was renamed the **European Union**. Throughout the 1990s, the Union's influence grew. Its most notable achievement was the launching in early 1999 of the **euro**, which by 2002 had become the common currency in twelve of the member nations.

In May 2004, the European Union added ten new nations, raising the total number of members to twenty-five. (See Map 22-1, p. 864.) Membership in the European Union indicated that a nation had achieved economic stability and genuinely democratic institutions. At the time, some older member states worried that several of the new member states from the former Soviet bloc were relatively poor and would require much economic support from the Union. Ironically, it was states in Western and Southern Europe, not Eastern Europe, that plunged the EU into a debt crisis in 2010.

Discord over the Union

The 2004 expansion of the European Union may mark for some time the high point of European integration. During that year the leaders of the member nations adopted a new constitutional treaty for the Union. This treaty, generally known as the **European Constitution**, was a long, detailed, and highly complicated document involving a bill of rights and complex economic and political agreements among all the member states. It would have transferred considerable decision-making authority from the governments of the individual states to the central institutions of the European Union, many of which are located in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg. To become effective, all the member states had to ratify the constitution either by their parliaments or through national referendums.

To the surprise of many in the European elite, in the spring of 2005, referendums held in France and the Netherlands heavily defeated the new constitutional treaty. Britain, where support for further European integration was lukewarm at best, immediately postponed holding its own referendum. Public opinion in other nations also soured on the constitutional treaty. Furthermore, immediately after these events, discord erupted over the Union's internal budget. These events marked an unprecedented crisis for the European Union and for the project of European integration. A similar crisis erupted in 2008 when a referendum in Ireland failed to support changes in the European Union that would create shared institutions of foreign policy formulation and military policy.



Read the Document

"A Common Market and European Integration (1960)" on **MyHistoryLab.com**



European Union The new name given to the EEC in 1993. It included most of the states of Western Europe.

euro The common currency created by the EEC in the late 1990s.




Read the Document "Treaty on European Union, 1992" on **MyHistoryLab.com**



European Constitution A treaty adopted in 2004 by European Union member nations; it was a long, detailed, and highly complicated document involving a bill of rights and complex economic and political agreements among all the member states.



View the Map "European Union" on **MyHistoryLab.com**



Map 22-1 **THE GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION** This map traces the growth of membership in the European Union from its founding in 1957 through the introduction of its newest members in 2007. Note that Turkey, though having applied for membership, has not yet been admitted.

Several factors appear to have brought the European Union to this pass. First, for at least the past fifteen years, a gap has been growing between the European political elites who have led the drive toward unity and the European voting public. The former have either ignored the latter or have moved the project along with only

narrow majorities. Second, the general Western European economy has stagnated for the last decade with relatively high rates of unemployment, especially among the young. Voting against the constitution was a way to voice discontent with this situation. Third, many of the smaller member states of the European Union have felt that France and Germany have either ignored them or taken them for granted. Fourth, some nations have come to believe that they were placed at an economic disadvantage when the Euro replaced their former national currencies because the rates of exchange were unfairly calculated. Fifth, many people in the various states, large and small, have become increasingly reluctant to cede national sovereignty and the authority to make economic decisions to the bureaucracy in Brussels. Britain, for example, would like to see less economic regulation. France, on the other hand, is loath to see the European Union gain the power to revise the French labor code with its extensive protections and benefits for workers.



A woman stands between a “yes” and a “no” campaign poster in reference to France’s referendum on the EU constitution in a street of Rennes, western France, Friday May 27, 2005, two days before the vote. AP Wide World Photos

Finally, another large issue has informed the internal skeptics of the current European Union. Over the past several years, the leaders of the major member states have grown more favorable to the eventual admission of Turkey as a member state. If Turkey were admitted, Europe would have to integrate into the Union a state whose population is larger and much poorer than that of any other member state. This would place enormous social and economic burdens on the other states. Furthermore, although the Turkish government has long been seen as adamantly secular, the Turkish people are overwhelmingly Muslim. This “Islamic factor” has become increasingly controversial among those Europeans who, whether they are religiously observant or not, believe European culture to be Christian, and among those secular Europeans who are deeply concerned about the political, economic, and social implications of the Continent’s already significant Muslim population. These tensions grew after 2005 when a Danish newspaper published self-consciously irreverent cartoons insulting the Prophet Muhammad. Riots broke out in parts of the Islamic world and in subsequent years Danish businesses and embassies abroad became targets of Islamic attacks.

▼ New American Leadership and Financial Crisis

Much of the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed considerable strain between the new post-Soviet Union Europe and the United States. As noted in Chapter 21, the immediate European reaction to the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, were sympathetic. The events leading up to the U.S. Iraq invasion in 2003 and the violence occurring since that invasion caused considerable strain between the United States and Europe, especially in terms of popular opinion. Europeans, through their press and to some extent through their governments, voiced much criticism over what they regarded as United States unilateral action in its foreign policy.

Three events in 2008 may have begun to change this situation and possibly to lessen those tensions. The first was the Russian invasion of Georgia, discussed in Chapter 21. The United States and the European Union agreed in condemning that action. Second, the American presidential election of 2008 saw the strong victory of Barack Obama, the Democratic Party candidate. Obama is the first African American to be elected to the presidency. He ran on a platform critical of the Iraq invasion and American unilateralism. Even though he also voiced strong support for the war in Afghanistan, Obama generated enormous popular support across Europe. Indeed, during the campaign he gave a speech in Berlin that drew a crowd of tens of thousands. Obama’s victory in the presidential election and the expansion of Democratic Party majorities in Congress appear to have persuaded, at least for the moment, many Europeans that their assumptions about American culture were incorrect and that a new era of American foreign and domestic policy is at hand. Congressional resistance to many of President Obama’s initiatives, however, have made his support in the American population seem much less assured than in the months immediately following his election.

Third, during the second half of 2008 a major international financial crisis potentially of the dimensions of that of the 1930s overwhelmed the American, transatlantic, and world economies. The crisis originated in the United States mortgage market where numerous major banks found themselves holding mortgages that could not be paid. Several major financial institutions in the United States failed, as did some banks in Europe. The United States and some European governments intervened deeply in areas of the economy where they had previously generally refrained from intervening. Stock markets around the world lost a third or more of their value. The interconnectedness of world markets demonstrated itself as never before, with financial panic displaying itself around the globe.

Was the year 2008 a turning point in the relationship between the United States and Europe?

Document

AN ENGLISH BUSINESS EDITOR CALLS FOR EUROPE TO TAKE CHARGE OF ITS ECONOMIC FUTURE



Richard Lofthouse is the editor of CNBC European Business, a magazine devoted to contemporary economic and business life. Educated in both Great Britain and the United States, Lofthouse brings a personal global perspective to his analysis. In the summer of 2008 he observed the tendency of Europeans to see their economic life as driven by global forces outside their control. In the face of such challenges, he called upon his readers to recall their cultural heritage and to embrace a spirit of entrepreneurship.

Why are the challenges facing Europe and the West today international and global in contrast to the domestic political challenges of the third quarter of the twentieth century? What are the forces outside Europe impacting its economic life? What are the cultural qualities to which Lofthouse seeks to rally his readers?

In 1968, rioting across the US followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, while in France students and workers hoped to oust Charles de Gaulle's government. Broadly speaking these tumultuous events concerned generational conflict over prevailing values within the societies where the riots broke out. Forty years later, all the images of civil disobedience such as French fisherman dumping their catches and British hauliers blocking roads illustrate self-interest triggered by global forces rather than local ones, such as rising fuel and food prices.

If globalisation is a bus trip, then, Europe appears to have been steadily reduced in status from driver to conductor to helpless passenger. Almost none of the big issues currently shaping its future are European. In the past six months fear has intensified over China's economic rise and India has become the most seductive destination for entrepreneurial retailers. Most European banks have lost at least half of their value due to wildly misguided risk assessment in the US while most of the rise in the oil price reflects non-Western supply and demand habits.

One might paint Europe as the hapless victim of globalisation. Consideration of energy security suggests that the crunch will worsen as natural gas supplies evaporate (as if high oil prices weren't enough to keep you awake at night). Meanwhile, analysis of the future of retailing suggests that online retailing is set to soar, not least because even Americans are driving less in a bid to keep fuel costs down. Malls might have only just opened their doors in

some emerging markets but in the West they face an uncertain future. The aviation industry believes that if oil remains at \$135 a barrel, the world's airlines will lose \$6.1bn this year.

It seems as if every business model in town is in the process of being wrecked by OPEC, or China's soaring resource demands, or greedy bankers; in reply, citizens protest that Congress or the European Union Commissioner or big oil companies should fix it and really, you know, it is someone else's fault. But that's not our view. In fact, it might be worth remembering Einstein's credo that "the significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking with which we created them." This fragment is the basis of most of the entrepreneurship espoused in this publication, and it opens the door to creative solutions to problems that are invariably both global and local.

Europe has a leadership role to play in globalization, providing not just technological solutions to pressing problems such as climate change but perhaps more importantly offering a deep heritage of cultural intelligence and humanity arising from its eighteenth century Enlightenment.

There are hopeful signs to which one may point. A telemetry company is helping hauliers to cut their fuel consumption; an electric car project, backed by both Israel's government and Renault-Nissan, may herald the end of the internal combustion engine as we know it, and a book called *WASTEconomics* bristles with private sector solutions to excessive waste, the product of our extraordinary affluence.

European Debt Crisis

From the start, European states with strong economies knew that there was a risk involved in sharing a common European currency with less affluent countries. The premise of the *Eurozone*, as the group of countries that shared the euro came to be known, was that each country would control its deficits and maintain a stable economy. Countries like Greece and Italy had to lower their inflation rates and deficits in order to qualify for the Euro, and they had to promise to maintain those lower rates once they adopted the new currency. Participation in the Euro made countries appear to be safer investments, and Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal were able to borrow money at favorable interest rates. In 2009, the new socialist government in Greece announced that the appearance of economic stability in Greece was based on the previous government's falsification of data: the deficit was, they announced, actually twice what it had been reported to be. Foreign investors withdrew not only from the Greek economy, but from other potentially risky economies like Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, and those countries' governments had trouble refinancing their substantial debts. In order to prevent the crisis from spilling over into other countries, Eurozone leaders like Germany have insisted on strict and unpopular austerity measures designed to lower deficits in Southern Europe. This has, in turn, raised issues over national sovereignty and the ability of individual member states to control their own economies. As has been the case in response to the financial crisis in the United States, some commentators argue that austerity measures, which include freezing or drastically reducing government spending, punish working-class Europeans for unscrupulous or speculative behavior on the part of economists, investors, and bankers. Debates about whether increased or reduced government spending would be more effective in ensuring economic recovery in Southern Europe are likely to continue for many years.



Outside the parliament building in February 2012, Greek citizens protest austerity measures aimed at reducing Greece's debt and securing loans from the European Union and other international organizations. This is just one battle in the fight to determine who should be responsible for rectifying the economic problems that had been mounting over the previous decade: the wealthy and big business through increased taxation or working people through reduced government services. Aristidis Vafeiadakis/ZUMA Press/Newscom

 **View the Closer Look** “The Copenhagen Opera House” on MyHistoryLab.com

In ongoing debates about the wisdom of a common European currency, the fate of the Euro has been linked to the fate of the European Union itself. At the present, it is difficult to imagine that the effort to unify in Europe will either halt or be reversed. It also seems certain that all future developments will move much more slowly and will require increasingly complicated negotiations. Moreover, the future of the European Union has become enmeshed in often bitter and divisive debates within the member states over social policies, the future of their economies, and what role the state should play in economic affairs.

In Perspective

After decades of warfare and tension in the first half of the century, European society developed peacefully in the postwar period. France and Germany became natural allies, both working toward the common cause of European integration. Migration and the economic growth of the second half of the century reshaped the society of many European nations. Welfare systems provided an extensive social safety net. The role and opportunities for women in society expanded. More and more Europeans across the Continent attended universities. The end of Soviet domination began a process in which Eastern Europe increasingly came to participate in the affluence of the West with its myriad consumer goods.

By the close of the century, Europe, like much of the rest of the world, had entered a new technological revolution through the computer and advances in medical care. Economic growth slowed in the 1990s, but most of Europe outside the former communist-dominated regions continued to enjoy some of the highest standards of living in the world, under liberal democratic governments.

The efforts to unify Europe have transformed the Continent and the everyday lives of its citizens. The future of the European Union, however, now stands at a crossroads. The advancing financial crisis will only place new demands on the Union.

Europe no longer dominates global cultural or economic forces in the way that it did at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, Europe is only one player in a global community of states that often look to their own traditions, rather than Europe, for models of how to organize societies, governments, and their interactions with one another.

KEY TERMS

euro (p. 863)
European Constitution
(p. 863)

European Economic
Community (EEC)
(p. 862)

European Union (p. 863)
existentialism (p. 847)
Green movement (p. 853)

socialist realism (p. 857)

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- How did migration affect twentieth-century European social life? What internal and external forces led to migration?
- In what specific ways was Europe Americanized in the second half of the twentieth century? How do you explain the trend toward a consumer society?
- How has Islamic migration into Europe affected social tensions on the Continent? How did the migration come about? What are incidents occurring in Europe that have raised resentment within the Islamic world?
- How did women's social and economic roles change in the second half of the twentieth century? What changes and problems have women faced since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe?

5. How did the pursuit and diffusion of knowledge change in the twentieth century? What have been the effects of the communications revolutions? Has Western intellectual life become more unified or less so? Why?
6. What were the technological steps in the emergence of the computer? What changes will computers bring in the next decade?
7. What were the major steps in the emergence of the European Union? Why is the Union now facing a crisis?